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Abstract: This study investigates the influences of board gender diversity and board 
independence on firm performance. Ordinary least squares, two-stage least squares and 
generalised method of moments are employed to test the relationships among board gender 
diversity, board independence, and firm performance in firms listed on Bursa Malaysia 
between 2010 and 2015. The regression results indicate that female directors and 
independent directors significantly and negatively affect firm performance, respectively. 
However, the interaction term of board gender diversity and board independence is 
statistically insignificant. Overall, managers must consider that board gender diversity 
and board independence may not have an interactive effect on improving the performance 
of their firms. 
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Sharing experiences and related inputs in a company may result in strong 
corporate governance (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000), of which board gender 
diversity is a key indicator. Board gender diversity has been widely debated 
in research (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008) because this concept plays 
not only an important role in firm-level governance but also reflects the 
participation of women in various economic activities. While board gender 
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diversity may bring about expertise and knowledge that can benefit firm 
performance, this factor may also lead to low efficiency (Maznevski, 1994). 
Most studies on board gender diversity (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Bernardi, 
Bosco & Columb, 2009; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004) have focused on the 
presence, percentage or number of female directors in the boardroom. 
Board independence may be used as a mechanism of good corporate 
governance. However, few empirical studies, such as Hsu and Wu (2014) 
found that the likelihood of corporate failure increases along with board 
independence. Moreover, Bhagat and Black (2002) challenged the positive 
effect of board independence and asserted that board independence might 
indicate poor firm performance. Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011) and 
Kim, Mauldin, and Patro (2014) also found that an independent board of 
directors does not contribute to firm performance in the US unlike those 
executive directors with better firm-specific knowledge yet exhibit a greater 
tendency to manipulate financial reporting. 
Although board gender diversity improves board communication and the 
board monitoring process (Joy, 2008), we find that having female directors 
can mitigate the drawbacks of having independent directors. Female 
directors engage in independent thinking and diligence in governance more 
often compared with independent directors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). 
Therefore, the impacts of board gender diversity and board independence on 
the outcome of companies warrant an empirical exploration. To address this 
gap, this study examines the individual and interactive influences of female 
directors and independent directors on firm performance. 
Malaysia provides an interesting setting for this study because of three 
reasons. Firstly, Malaysia differs from other emerging markets because of its 
commitment to promoting the participation of women in business-related 
activities. The Malaysian government has recently encouraged publicly 
listed firms to have at least 30% of females to participate in their decision-
making processes. Secondly, Malaysia has a deep-rooted culture where 
women are prevented from progressing in their jobs. Therefore, female 
directors and their performance are simultaneously influenced by their 
government policies and social culture, thereby providing an interesting 
setting to study the interplay between institutional and societal attributes 
(Abdullah, Ismail & Nachum, 2016). Thirdly, Malaysian firms share 
corporate governance characteristics similar to firms in emerging markets. 
Their legal infrastructure can be considered developed because the Malaysia 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) is regulatory driven, and has been 
revised and improved for a few times. 
This study contributes to the literature by differentiating female directors 
from independent directors and by examining whether female directors can 
help mitigate the potential negative effects of independent directors. 
Although board gender diversity and board independence significantly and 
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negatively affect firm performance as shown in our regression results, we 
find that female directors may not interact much with independent directors 
in influencing the outcomes of their firms. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section 
reviews the related literature. The third section presents the research 
methodology. The fourth section discusses the empirical results while the 
fifth section concludes the paper. 
 
2.     Literature Review 
 
2.1    Board Gender Diversity and Firm Performance 
 
The board of directors focuses on protecting and promoting the interests of 
shareholders, customers, suppliers, employees, society and environment and 
on addressing financial matters (Finegold, Benson & Hecht, 2007; Williams, 
2003). Compared with their male counterparts, female directors show more 
concern on the sensitivity of their stakeholders (Bear, Rahman & Post, 2010; 
Huse, 2005) and make better decisions (Hillman, Shropshire & Cannella, 
2007; Milliken & Martins, 1996) that can contribute to high firm 
performance (Conyon & He, 2017). Board gender diversity can also improve 
corporate governance (Gul, Srinidhi & Ng, 2011). The number of studies on 
board gender diversity and firm performance from different countries has 
increased in recent years because of the unique knowledge, information and 
variety of experiences, skills and networks of gender-diverse boards 
(Hillman et al., 2007; Miller & del Carmen Triana, 2009). This argument is 
supported by Low, Roberts and Whiting (2015), who investigated Asian 
firms in Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore and found that 
the appointment of female directors can positively affect the return on 
investments of these firms. Similarly, Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) 
and Finegold et al. (2007) found a positive relationship between female 
directors and firm performance amongst US companies as measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) also reported that female directors exert 
a stronger positive effect on firm performance, especially those controlled by 
legal entities, because female directors in controlling firms devote much 
effort in monitoring and improving the operations and financial performance 
of their firms.  
Conversely, Strydom, Au Yong, and Rankin (2016) found that board 
gender diversity may not affect firm performance in terms of earnings 
quality. They also found that a higher proportion of female directors on the 
board of Australian firms corresponds to a lower stock price volatility. Rose 
(2007) showed that board gender diversity does not influence the 
performance of listed Danish firms from 1998 to 2001 as measured by 
Tobin’s Q. Similarly, Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, and Simpson (2010) 
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reported an insignificant relationship between female directors and firm 
performance for S&P 500 index firms from 1998 until 2002. Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) and Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior, and Voelpel (2015) 
highlighted a negative relationship between female directors and firm 
performance due to these directors’ lack of skills and experiences in 
monitoring the performance of their firms. They added that female directors 
might not be employed based on their level of expertise and experiences but 
rather based on their family relationships (Bianco, Ciavarella, & Signoretti, 
2015; Saeed, Yousaf & Alharbi, 2017).  
Based on the above arguments, we propose the following non-directional 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Board gender diversity influences firm performance 
 
2.2    Board Independence and Firm Performance 
 
The MCCG recommends that one-third of the board of directors of a 
company must comprise independent directors. Many studies have examined 
the relationship between corporate governance, particularly board 
independence, and firm performance. However, their findings on the 
relationship between board independence and firm performance are mostly 
inconclusive (Terjesen, Couto & Francisco, 2016). Scholars have mostly 
applied three theories to explain such a relationship. 
Firstly, agency theory describes the conflicts of interest between the 
principal (owner) and agent (management) (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
According to this theory, firms can improve their performance if they have a 
large number of independent directors on their board because these directors 
are outsiders who have no critical interests in the firm (Terjesen et al., 2016) 
and can monitor and advise managers who, in turn, can encourage and 
influence shareholder interests (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). However, 
this view has been challenged. Firstly, those independent directors who 
usually hold multiple board memberships are very busy leading to poor firm 
performance (Kumar & Sivaramakrishnan, 2008). Secondly, independent 
directors may be unable to influence CEOs to perform actions on behalf of 
them because they do not have the formal authority to do so (Oshry, 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010; Rashid, 2018).  
Secondly, resource dependency theory focuses on the external resources 
(e.g. knowledge, network or social resources, expertise and legitimacy) 
brought by independent directors to their firms. According to Terjesen et al. 
(2016), independent directors have unique experiences and knowledge that 
they gain from other firms, and these resources can help firms increase their 
profit and achieve success. However, given that independent directors lack 
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insider information about their firms, they may not be competent enough to 
perform their assigned tasks (Rashid, 2018). 
Thirdly, upper echelons theory explains that the behaviour, experience 
and values of executives can impact firm performance. Zhu, Ye, Tucker, and 
Chan (2016) found that empowering independent directors may promote 
efficient monitoring and increase firm value. However, Hambrick (2007) 
argued that executives might not use their expertise and skills in the 
boardroom. In other words, board independence may not be able to improve 
firm performance (Laux, 2008; Wang, Lu & Tsai, 2011). Therefore, 
independent directors need to apply their expertise, skill and knowledge 
when making decisions (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). 
Upon combining the above arguments, we propose the following non-
directional hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Board independence is related to firm performance 
 
2.3    Board Gender Diversity, Board Independence and Firm               
Performance 
 
Compared with male leaders, female leaders in firms have stronger 
communication channels with female customers given the similarities in 
their life experiences and perspectives. In addition, having a large number of 
females in the board of directors can increase the opportunities for a firm to 
improve its performance because such firm can gain a better understanding 
of its customers’ needs and behaviours (Ahmadi, Nakaa & Bouri, 2018). 
However, Liu et al. (2014) found that female executive directors have a 
significant positive effect on firm performance yet did not observe the same 
effect for female independent directors. Based on resources dependence 
theory, an independent board can benefit the firm through the external 
resources (i.e. knowledge, network and experience) brought by independent 
directors to the firm (De Cabo, Gimeno & Nieto, 2012). This finding is 
surprising because the external resources brought by female independent 
directors do not significantly affect firm performance (Bianco et al., 2015). 
This argument is further supported by Terjesen et al. (2016) who found that 
external independent directors do not contribute to firm performance unless 
the board is gender diversified. Liu et al. (2014) added that female 
independent directors have fewer opportunities to observe and influence firm 
performance given their lack of insider information about the operating 
activities of their firms. In other words, female executive directors are more 
effective in performing monitoring duties compared with female 
independent directors. In this case, we empirically investigate whether the 
interaction between independent directors and female directors affects firm 
performance. 
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Following the above arguments, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Female directors interact with independent directors in 
influencing firm performance 
 
3.     Data and Methodology 
 
3.1    Sample Selection 
 
This study selects the top 200 Malaysian firms (as of 31 December 2015) 
listed in Bursa Malaysia from 2010 to 2015. To minimise the influence of 
the 2007–2009 global financial crisis on firm performance, the sample period 
for this study begins in 2010. Those firms with missing values are removed 
from the sample. Extremely large or small firms are also excluded from the 
sample because of their low representativeness. We also exclude banks and 
financial firms because they are following a different governance system and 
because interest rates are beyond the scope of this study. All financial data 
used in this study are available in the Thomson Reuters Eikon database, 
while the data on CEO characteristics and corporate governance are obtained 
from the annual reports of the sampled firms. We acknowledge that our panel 
data for the top 200 companies are unbalanced because these firms are 
notable for their good corporate governance practices, which allow us to 
examine the influence of board gender diversity and board independence in 
a good corporate environment.  
 
3.2    Model Specification   
 
Regression models are built for this study as they can capture more 
information compared with single cross-section and time series data. The 
equations are as follows:  
 
Performanceit = β1 BINDit + β2 BDIVit + Controlsit + INDUSTRY +   
YEAR + εit                                                               (1) 
Performanceit  =  β1 BINDit+ β2 BDIVit + β3 BINDit × BDIVit + Controlsit 
+ INDUSTRY + YEAR + εit                                       (2) 
 
The above models can be estimated to examine the relationship amongst 
board independence, board gender diversity and firm performance. To 
address the estimation bias resulting from the omission of variables, several 
time-invariant variables that may affect firm performance are controlled. 
This study mainly employs ordinary least square (OLS) with a robust 
standard error given its wide usage in corporate governance studies when 
dealing with potential heterogeneity issues.  
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In the model, i represents the firm unit, t denotes the point of time and ε 
is the error term. ROA and ROE are two dependent variables representing 
firm performance and are measured by net income over total assets and net 
income over total equities, respectively, as shown in previous studies (Liu et 
al., 2014; Marwa & Aziakpono, 2015; Omran, Bolbol & Fatheldin, 2008). 
The key independent variables that are analysed in this study include board 
independence (BIND) and board gender diversity (BDIV). Following Kang, 
Cheng, and Gray (2007) and Liu et al. (2014), BIND is measured as the 
percentage of independent directors in a corporate board. Meanwhile, 
following Carter et al. (2010), BDIV is calculated as the percentage of female 
directors on a corporate board. 
This study also controls some important corporate governance variables 
that may influence firm performance. The control variables selected 
represent CEO character variables and ownership structure variables; these 
variables are selected since they may endogenously determine BDIV and 
BIND, and affect firm performance at the same time. Board size (BSIZE) 
and board meeting (BMEET) are measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of directors and number of meetings, respectively (Liu et al., 2014; 
Saeed et al., 2017; Strydom et al., 2016; Vafeas, 1999). This study also 
controls CEO characteristics, including CEO tenure (CTEN), CEO age 
(CAGE), CEO compensation (CCOMP), CEO ownership (COWN), CEO 
gender (CGEN) and CEO race (CRACE). Government ownership (GOWN), 
foreign ownership (FOWN) and ownership concentration are used to 
represent ownership structure characteristics.  
 
Table 1:Definition of variables 
Abbreviation Variable Measurement 
ROA Firm performance Net income/beginning total assets (Marwa & 
Aziakpono, 2015) 
ROE Net income/beginning total equity (Omran et al., 
2008) 
BDIV Board gender 
diversity 




Independent directors/total directors (Kang et al., 
2007; Liu et al., 2014) 
BSIZE Board size Natural logarithm of the number of directors 
(Omran et al., 2008; Saeed et al., 2017) 
BMEET Board meeting Natural logarithm of the number of meetings 
(Vafeas, 1999) 
CTEN CEO tenure Number of years that a manager has been serving 
at a CEO position until the year of entry (Coles, 
Daniel, & Naveen, 2006) 
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Table 1: (Continue) 
Abbreviation Variable Measurement 
CAGE CEO age Age of the CEO (Coles et al., 2006) 
CCOMP CEO 
compensation 
Natural logarithm of the total of compensation of 
the CEO during the year (Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 
2011) 
COWN CEO ownership Percentage of shares held by a CEO (Agrawal & 
Knoeber, 1996) 
CGEN CEO gender Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO is 
female and equal to 0 otherwise (Abor, 2007) 
CRACE  CEO race  Dummy variable that is equal to 1, 2, 3 or 4 if the 




Measured as the percentages of shares held by a 
government (Liu et al., 2014; Ting & Lean, 2011)  
FOWN Foreign 
ownership 
Measured as the percentages of shares held by 
foreigners (Liu et al., 2014) 
Top3 Ownership 
concentration 
Percentage of shares owned by the top 3 largest 
shareholders (Omran et al., 2008) 
FSIZE Firm size  Natural logarithm of total assets (Ting & Lean, 
2011) 
 
4.     Empirical Findings and Discussion 
 
4.1    Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. 
To reduce the impact of extreme observations, this study winsorised all the 
variables at 1% of each tail of the distribution. Firstly, we find that the sample 
companies utilised approximately 19% and 39.7% of their liabilities and 
debts to finance their assets, respectively. The mean values of ROA (0.079) 
and ROE (0.142) indicate that the firms are profitable at around 7.9% and 
14.2% of their total assets and invested capital, respectively. The percentages 
of board gender diversity and board independence are approximately 12.6% 
and 45.1%, respectively. Meanwhile, the mean logged value of 2.115 on 
board size suggests that the sampled companies have approximately eight 
persons at the board level. The average number of board meetings is 6 
(logged value of 1.713). For CEO personal characteristics, Malaysian CEOs 
serve as CEOs of their companies for 8 to 9 years on average and are mostly 
aged 55 years and above. The CCOMP value of 14.473 indicates that the 
CEO remuneration in the sampled companies is approximately RM1.930 
million on average. CEOs hold around 3.36% of these companies’ 
shareholdings. Most Malaysian CEOs are males while only 4.1% are 
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females. An estimated 5.5% and 7.6% of the Malaysian listed companies’ 
shareholdings are owned by government and foreign investors, respectively. 
The three largest shareholders own 56 percent of the shareholdings on 
average. The mean value of logged firm size (14.402) indicates that these 
companies have approximately RM1,797 billion of total assets on average 
(logged value of 14.402). 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables N Mean Minimum Maximum Standard  
Deviation 
25% 50% 75% 
ROA 1,177 0.079 -0.561 0.774 0.086 0.034 0.066 0.108 
ROE 1,177 0.142 -3.661 1.721 0.219 0.067 0.118 0.175 
BDIV 1,177 0.126 0 1 0.126 0 0.125 0.182 
BIND 1,177 0.451 0.222 0.875 0.117 0.380 0.430 0.500 
BSIZE 1,177 2.115 1.609 2.773 0.232 1.950 2.080 2.303 
BMEET 1,177 1.713 0.693 2.565 0.312 1.390 1.610 1.946 
CTEN 1,177 8.878 0 43.000 7.117 3.000 8.000 12.000 
CCOMP 1,177 14.473 11.175 17.304 0.810 14.036 14.443 14.894 
COWN 1,177 0.0336 0 0.605 0.071 0 0.0002 0.003 
CGEN 1,177 0.041 0 1 0.198 0 0 0 
GOWN 1,177 0.055 0 0.900 0.092 0 0.012 0.090 
FOWN 1,177 0.076 0 0.850 0.131 0 0.016 0.102 
Top3 1,177 0.560 0.014 0.884 0.164 0.444 0.572 0.672 
FSIZE 1,177 14.402 7.984 18.305 1.441 13.508 14.325 15.174 
 
As can be seen in the correlation matrix in Table 3, the highest correlation 
is observed between CAGE and CTEN (0.400), thereby suggesting no 
multicollinearity problem. We also checked the variance inflation factor 
values to ensure the absence of any serious multicollinearity problem. 
 
4.1    Board Gender Diversity, Board Independence and Firm Performance 
 
This section reports the findings of the relationship between board gender 
diversity and firm performance as well as that between board independence 
and firm performance. The interaction effect of board gender diversity and 
board independence on firm performance is also highlighted. A Pearson 
correlation test is conducted to check for the correlations amongst the 
explanatory variables. The unreported results show that the degree of 
associations is generally weak as indicated by the low values of the 
coefficients. In other words, the correlation coefficients are insufficiently 
large to create any collinearity issue in the regression analyses.
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Table 3: Correlation analysis 
 ROA BDIV BIND BDIV_BIND BSIZE BMEET CTEN CAGE CCOMP COWN CGEN GOWN FOWN Top3 
ROA 1              
BDIV -0.041 1             
BIND -0.059 0.108* 1            
BDIV_BIND 0.020 0.145* 0.083 1           
BSIZE -0.037 0.082 -0.205* -0.097 1          
BMEET -0.075 0.105* 0.174* -0.007 0.219* 1         
CTEN -0.010 -0.065 -0.177* -0.040 -0.012 -0.268* 1        
CAGE -0.064 -0.137* -0.069 -0.114* -0.033 -0.006 0.400* 1       
CCOMP -0.002 -0.066 -0.069 -0.030 0.167* -0.083 0.226* 0.097 1      
COWN 0.020 -0.084 -0.053 -0.005 -0.049 -0.133* 0.226* 0.129* 0.083 1     
CGEN -0.016 0.070 -0.024 -0.051 -0.007 -0.004 -0.059 -0.043 -0.004 -0.089 1    
GOWN -0.079 0.083 0.058 0.047 0.193* 0.207* -0.069 -0.069 0.001 -0.072 0.094 1   
FOWN -0.026 -0.087 -0.082 -0.008 0.028 -0.077 0.084 0.079 0.160* 0.336* -0.088 -0.123* 1  
Top3 -0.001 -0.043 -0.021 -0.008 -0.020 0.003 -0.003 -0.015 0.019 -0.046 0.034 -0.021 -0.027 1 
FSIZE -0.296* -0.019 0.064 0.010 0.053 0.110* -0.084 -0.032 0.082 -0.006 0.057 0.139* -0.025 0.231* 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Interestingly, Model 1 in Table 4 indicates that the coefficients (-0.0461) 
on board gender diversity are negatively associated with firm performance. 
Similarly, the generalised method of moments (GMM) results presented in 
Model 2 show that the percentage of female directors has a significantly 
negative impact on firm performance. These results are consistent with those 
of previous studies (Carter et al., 2010; Rose, 2007; Strydom et al., 2016). 
They argue that board gender diversity does not influence the performance 
of the companies; female directors might not have sufficient expertise and 
experience. In this situation, the performance of the firm will drop due to 
having directors who lack skill and competence to perform their assigned 
tasks. 
 
The findings in Model 2 also show that board independence negatively 
influences firm performance; similar results are found in Model 3 when 
board independence and board gender diversity are simultaneously included. 
The results are in line with those of Oshry et al. (2010) and Rashid (2018), 
all of which find that board independence may not be able to improve firm 
performance. Even though, agency theory describes firms can improve their 
Table 4: Regression analysis–OLS (DV = ROA) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LEV -0.110*** (0.017) -0.109*** (0.016) -0.110*** (0.017) 
BDIV -0.046* (0.020) -0.042* (0.020) -0.041* (0.019) 
BIND  -0.042* (0.021) -0.042* (0.021) 
BDIV×BIND   -0.127 (0.236) 
BSIZE -0.006 (0.011) -0.0120 (0.011) -0.0127 (0.011) 
BMEET -0.009 (0.009) -0.007 (0.009) -0.0066 (0.009) 
CTEN -0.000 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) 
CAGE -0.001* (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) 
CCOMP 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003) 
COWN 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 
CGEN 0.006 (0.009) 0.005 (0.009) 0.004 (0.009) 
GOWN -0.044* (0.021) -0.042* (0.021) -0.043* (0.021) 
FOWN -0.027 (0.016) -0.027 (0.016) -0.027 (0.016) 
Top3 -0.018 (0.012) -0.019 (0.012) -0.019 (0.012) 
CRACE Yes Yes Yes 
INDUSTRY Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.128* (0.054) 0.154** (0.056) 0.156** (0.056) 
    
N 1,128 1,128 1,128 
adj. R2 0.123 0.125 0.125 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
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performance if they have a large number of independent directors (Terjesen 
et al., 2016) but when independent directors are from outsiders, they do not 
have the formal authority to influence CEOs to perform actions on behalf of 
them. 
We also test the interaction effect of board gender diversity and board 
independence on firm performance. The insignificant coefficient on board 
gender diversity × board independence in Model 3 indicates that female 
directors and independent directors may not work together towards 
influencing firm performance. The results indicate that the negative 
association between board gender diversity and firm performance is more 
pronounced with the presence of independent directors. Our findings 
corroborate with those concluded by Liu et al. (2014), Bianco et al. (2015), 
and Terjesen et al. (2016). 
Previous studies have highlighted a significant relationship between 
board independence and firm performance (Oshry et al., 2010; Terjesen et 
al., 2016) as well as between board gender diversity and firm performance 
(Gul et al., 2011; Hillman et al., 2007). However, based on our sample and 
analysis, board independence and board gender diversity negatively affect 
firm performance with some marginal effects. These findings also indicate 
that the effect of board gender diversity on firm performance does not vary 
by board independence. 
 
4.3    Endogeneity – Robustness Test 
 
OLS regression can be considered as an ideal model because this process 
assumes that all explanatory variables are strictly exogenous and that the 
error term is independently and identically distributed. However, previous 
studies (Shaukat, Qiu, & Trojanowski, 2016) show that board-related 
characteristics are endogenously related to firm performance. Therefore, we 
re-estimate the above models by adopting instrumental variable estimation 
approaches, namely, GMM and two-stage least squares (2SLS), which have 
become standard approach nowadays (Baltagi, Fingleton, & Pirotte, 2014). 
In the first stage of 2SLS, we estimate the endogenous variable by using the 
instrumental variables. Since board-related characteristics are endogenously 
related to firm performance, this study assumes that other board 
characteristics determine BDIV. Specifically, in the first stage, BDIV is 
instrumented by BSIZE and diversity dummy variables, which equal to 1 if 
BDIV is more than its median value. The post-estimation test performed also 
suggests that the instruments are valid and free from overidentifying 
restrictions. We then apply the estimated value of BDIV instead of the 
original value for our main regression. The GMM estimation procedure 
developed by (Arellano & Bond, 1991) has been proven to be highly 
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efficient. The key argument of this procedure is that the essential instruments 
are within the model equation. The endogenous variables can be 
instrumented by their past values and by the external instruments. 
The results in Table 5 suggest that the coefficients of board gender 
diversity and board independence become insignificant and may not affect 
firm performance. These results are obtained after controlling for other board 
characteristics, CEO characteristics, ownership concentration and firm 
characteristics. 
 
Table 5: Regression Analysis–GMM and 2SLS (DV =ROA) 
 (DV =ROA) (DV =ROA) (DV =ROE) (DV =ROE) 
Variable GMM 2SLS GMM 2SLS 
LEV -0.078* (0.037) -0.128*** (0.017) -0.145 (0.150) -0.011 (0.046) 
BDIV -0.023 (0.019) -0.047* (0.019) -0.120 (0.083) -0.121* (0.051) 
BIND -0.006 (0.018) -0.034 (0.021) -0.044 (0.055) -0.123* (0.058) 
BSIZE 0.004 (0.0091) -0.012 (0.011) 0.0251 (0.024) -0.002 (0.031) 
BMEET -0.006 (0.006) -0.004 (0.009) -0.025 (0.027) -0.002 (0.023) 
CTEN -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 
CAGE -0.000 (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002* (0.009) 
CCOMP -0.001 (0.003) 0.008* (0.003) -0.003 (0.008) 0.026** (0.008) 
COWN -0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
CGEN -0.007 (0.012) 0.008 (0.012) 0.036 (0.053) 0.067* (0.032) 
GOWN 0.036 (0.033) -0.024 (0.027) 0.040 (0.078) -0.086 (0.073) 
FOWN -0.014 (0.017) -0.028 (0.020) -0.092 (0.077) -0.118* (0.053) 
Top3 -0.009 (0.025) 0.006 (0.015) -0.050 (0.082) -0.035 (0.041) 
FSIZE -0.000 (0.005) -0.011*** (0.002) 0.020 (0.018) -0.014** (0.005) 
CRACE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
INDUS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Lagged ROA 0.542***(0.122)    
Lagged ROE   0.358 (0.189)  
_cons 0.103 (0.097) 0.272*** (0.056) 0.004 (0.020) 0.158 (0.152) 
N 940 1,128 940 1,128 
adj. R2  0.152  0.100 
hansenp 0.915  0.794  
ar2p 0.454  0.553  
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
To further verify the validity of our results, we regress another corporate 
outcome on the same set of explanatory variables. Specifically, we replace 
ROA with ROE. Interestingly, the results in Table 6 remain the same, that is, 
board independence, instead of board gender diversity, produces significant 
effects and demonstrates interaction effects on ROE. Overall, board gender 
14     Qian Long Kweh et al. 
 
diversity and board independence may have individual and marginal effects 
on firm performance. 
 
Table 6: Regression Analysis–OLS (DV = ROE) 
Variable Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) 
LEV 0.064 (0.073) 0.066 (0.072) 0.063 (0.074) 
BDIV -0.121 (0.09) -0.109 (0.088) -0.097 (0.078) 
BIND  -0.135** (0.051) -0.132** (0.049) 
BDIV_BIND   -0.931 (0.924) 
BSIZE 0.022 (0.043) 0.002 (0.041) -0.003 (0.038) 
BMEET -0.015 (0.021) -0.007 (0.022) -0.007 (0.022) 
CGEN 0.064 (0.037) 0.059 (0.037) 0.055 (0.036) 
CTEN -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 
CAGE -0.002* (0.000) -0.002* (0.001) -0.002* (0.001) 
CCOMP 0.020** (0.007) 0.021** (0.007) 0.021** (0.007) 
COWN 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 
GOWN -0.117 (0.062) -0.113 (0.061) -0.121 (0.064) 
FOWN -0.116 (0.066) -0.118 (0.066) -0.116 (0.065) 
Top3 -0.065 (0.041) -0.067 (0.041) -0.067 (0.041) 
CRACE Yes Yes Yes 
INDUS Yes Yes Yes 
YEAR Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -0.077 (0.138) 0.005 (0.138) 0.023 (0.142) 
N 1,128 1,128 1,128 
adj. R2 0.063 0.067 0.069 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Values in parentheses are standard errors. 
 
Overall, we find similar results with the different proxies of firm 
performance and also used different analysis methods. Thus, the results, 
which are consistent with those of Liu et al. (2014), Bianco et al. (2015) and 
Terjesen et al. (2016), suggest that female and independent directors in the 
boardroom do not necessarily contribute to better firm performance. Several 
crucial findings emerge in this study. First, from the perspective of agency 
theory, independent directors may be unable to monitor management 
because they are outsiders who are busy and less familiar with the companies 
or a lack of insider information about the operating activities of their firms. 
5.     Conclusion 
 
This study highlights the issues of board gender diversity and board 
independence in a fast-emerging market by taking Malaysia as an example 
given its reputation for being the first Asian government that pushed its 
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companies to have at least 30% of females working at their decision-making 
levels. However, each of the top 200 listed firms in Malaysia only has around 
12.6 female directors on average, while some of these firms do not have any 
female directors serving in their corporate boards. After examining its 
relationship with firm performance by applying various regression methods, 
board gender diversity is revealed to significantly reduce firm performance, 
which can be ascribed to the fact that female directors are unable to apply 
their expertise, knowledge, skills or influences in maximising the wealth of 
their company shareholders. Furthermore, independent directors may not 
positively affect the outcomes of their firms. Interestingly, the interaction 
term of board gender diversity and board independence is insignificant at the 
conventional statistical level, thereby suggesting that female directors and 
independent directors may not complement each other. 
This study provides some insights into the Malaysian corporate 
governance system that can also help governments from other emerging 
markets. Firstly, the ineffectiveness of independent directors may be 
attributed to the imperfect code of corporate governance. Policymakers must 
be aware of the actual state of board independence in companies. Secondly, 
given the deep-rooted culture of Malaysia, the government may need to wait 
for some time before companies allow females to participate in their 
decision-making processes. Having a small number of female directors may 
also mean companies are unable to detect the positive effects of these leaders 
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